The 2022 Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused a significant disruption in global food trade, particularly affecting the wheat market. Ukraine, one of the largest wheat exporters, faced severe export reductions due to the conflict, raising concerns about food security, especially for import-dependent low-income nations. However, international cooperation, including the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the EU’s Solidarity Lanes, helped to stabilize global wheat prices and mitigate the worst impacts of the crisis. This article outlines the methods used in our study and presents the key findings on international cooperation, potential risks, and coping strategies that could have altered the outcome.
Methods
To assess the impact of the Russian full-scale invasion in Ukraine on global wheat prices and wheat supply, we employ two complement models: the Trade With Storage (TWIST) model and the Food Shock Cascade (FSC) model. The TWIST model is a global trade model that calculates annual variations in wheat prices and storage movements based on supply and demand. The FSC model computes country-level supply shocks, incorporating production, imports, exports, and reserves. Both models were used in a scenario analysis to simulate the wheat price hike and impaired national wheat supply of the wheat trade year 2022, evaluating potential counterfactuals based on lacking international cooperation or historical events like harvest failures and export restrictions​.
International cooperation helped to avert aggravated food insecurity
Our analysis shows that international cooperation played a crucial role in averting a more severe food security crisis. The Black Sea Grain Initiative allowed Ukraine to reinstate maritime wheat exports despite the war, and the EU’s Solidarity Lanes enabled further exports via land and river routes. In addition, many nations that introduced wheat export restrictions at the start of 2022 later rolled back these measures. Without these efforts, the global wheat price could have risen by an additional 13 percentage points. ​
Nations heavily dependent on Ukrainian wheat, such as Tunisia, Libya, and Lebanon, would have faced drastic supply shortages by more than 39% compared to the pre-war situation.
It could have been worse
Further, we explore counterfactual scenarios based on historical stressors, such as multi-breadbasket harvest failures and escalating export restrictions, as seen during the 2007/08 food crisis. If these stressors had coincided with full blocked exports from Ukraine, the global wheat prices could have increased by about 90% compared to the long-term average between 2000–2020, surpassing the factual 2007/08 price by approximately 25% or US$35 per metric ton. As a result, over 28% of the countries would face wheat supply shortages that exceed their domestic reserves.
Potential coping strategies
We also examine potential coping strategies that were discussed but eventually not implemented (see Figure 1). One proposed strategy was to reduce the EU’s wheat consumption for animal feed by 30%, which would decrease global wheat demand by 1.3%. According to our simulations, that would have resulted in a lowering of the global wheat price by nearly 6 percentage points​. Another strategy was to mitigate global demand through a reduction of the wheat stockpiles of the economically powerful G7 countries and China by 1.5%, which would have led to a similar price reduction of about 6 percentage points.Â
On the supply side, increasing wheat production in major producing countries by 3% could have reduced the price hike by about 7 percentage points. When these moderate strategies were combined, they could have halved the 2022 price increase. If more rigorous mitigation strategies (-30% feed consumption globally, -7.6% wheat stocks of G7 & China, +3% wheat production globally) had been adopted, the price of wheat would have fallen by as much as 59 percentage points or US$56 per metric ton – pushing the price to roughly 22% below the 2000–2020 average level.
Figure 1: How coping strategies could have mitigated the conflict-induced wheat price hike.
Conclusion
The Russian invasion of Ukraine highlighted the fragility of the global food system to systemic shock, particularly for countries dependent on food imports. However, international cooperation, like the Black Sea Grain and the EU’s Solidarity Lanes Initiatives, were key to avert a much larger crisis. While there was a risk of a much larger crisis if global production had declined or if countries had further jeopardized international trade by escalating export restrictions, as in previous crises, our study also indicates that the crisis could have been further mitigated by the implementation of additional short-term coping strategies. As climate change and geopolitical tensions continue to pose threats to global agriculture, coordinated policy responses will be essential to ensure food security globally in times of crisis.